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THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: "PRIVATE"
OR "PUBLIC" OFFERING
By IRVING M. MEHLER of the Colorado and New York 13uIrs

The question relating to the sale of securities to a given number of persons in interstate commerce by the incipient corporation
as well as by the corporation of repute and long standing has in a
great many instances placed the attorney and the client on the
horns of a dilemma. On the one hand we find the corporation in
dire need of immediate capital, and on the other hand we find the
attorney unable to state precisely the number of persons who may
be approached to purchase stock in the corporation without violating the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 ' pertaining to
the registration of securities.
It is basic that a corporation seeking to raise a sum in excess
of $300,000.00 through a public offering of securities in interstate
commerce must file a registration statement with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Should the corporation find that its
financial straits could be alleviated with an amount less than
$300,000.00, it could seek an exemption from registration under
the Revised Regulation A 2 upon compliance with the provisions
of that regulation. In any event, whether the corporation is seeking a sum in excess of $300,000.00 from the public or whether it
is seeking an amount under $300,000.00, compliance with the Act
or the regulation, as the case may be, becomes mandatory.
In view of the fact that in the particular instance under discussion the financial needs of the corporation are pressing and a
"public offering" under both the Act and the regulation is time
consuming, it is the aim of this paper to explore the question of
how many persons may be approached to buy stock in a corporation without the transaction being considered a "public offering"
and therefore exempt from registration. Or to put the question
in another way: When is a sale of the securities of a corporation
in interstate commerce to a given number of persons considered a
"private offering" and therefore exempt from registration?
I.

DEFINITIONS
Before attempting to solve the ultimate problem, it may aid
considerably to note how all-embracing some of the following basic
working terms are under the Securities Act of 1933:
(1) The term "security" means any note stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
'48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77c.
215 U.S.C.. Sec. 77c(b) (1953).
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a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
(2) The term "person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a goverment or political subdivision thereof. As used in this
paragraph the term "trust" shall include only a trust
where the interest or interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are evidenced by a security.
(3) The term "sale," "sell," "offer to sell," or "offer
for sale" shall include every contract of sale or disposition
of, attempt to offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an
offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value;
except that such terms shall not include preliminary
negotiations or agreements between an issuer and any
underwriter. Any security given or delivered with, or as
a bonus on account of, any purchase of securities or any
other thing, shall be conclusively presumed to constitute
a part of the subject of such purchase and to have been
sold for value. The issue or transfer of a right or privilege, when originally issued or transferred with a security, giving the holder of such security the right to convert
such security into another security of the same issuer or
of another person, or giving a right to subscribe to another security of the same issuer or of another person,
which right cannot be exercised until some future date,
shall not be deemed to be a sale of such other security;
but the issue or transfer of such other security upon the
exercise of such right of conversion or subscription shall
be deemed a sale of such other security.
(4) The term "issuer" means every person who
issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with
respect to certificates of deposit, voting-trust certificates,
or collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated investment trust not having a board of directors (or persons
performing similar functions) or of the fixed, restricted
management, or unit type, the term "issuer" means the
person or persons performing the acts and assuming the
duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions
of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which
such securities are issued; except that in the case of an
unincorporated association which provides by its articles
for limited liability of any or all of its members, or in the
case of a trust, committee, or other legal entity, the
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trustees or members thereof shall not be individually
liable as issuers of any security issued by the association,
trust, committee, or other legal entity; except that with
respect to equipment-trust certificates or like securities,
the term "issuer" means the person by whom the equipment or property is or is to be used; and except that with
respect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, the term "issuer" means the owner
of any such right or of any interest in such right (whether
whole or fractional) who creates fractional interests
therein for the purpose of public offering.
(7) The term "interstate commerce" means trade
or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the several States or
between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the
United States and any State or other Territory, or between
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia.
II. OFFERINGS
(a) The Nature of a "Public Offering"
In speaking of a "public offering," the statute refers to transactions which are exempted from registration under the Act in the
following manner:
The provisions of section 77e of this title shall not
apply to any of the following transactions: (1) . . .
transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering . . .3
The paucity of language and the failure of the statute to even hint
at what might constitute a "public offering" has proven to be a
source of no uncertain concern to both the lawyer and the client.
The courts, too, have been plagued no end in determining the
legislative intent pertaining to when a "public offering" shall be
deemed to exist; in which event compliance with the statute and
its registration aspects become mandatory. A resort to the legislative history of the section aids little in clarifying the congressional intent except as may be gleaned from the House Committee's
reference to this exemption as permitting "an issuer to make a
specific or an isolated sale of its securities to a particular person.''
(b) Administrative Interpretation
During the early history of the Act, much confusion arose as
to the precise meaning of the second clause of Section 4(1) of the
Securities Act which exempts "transaction by an issuer not in115 U.S.C. Sec. 77d (1951).
4 H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. (1933) 15-16.
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volving any public offering." Not only was it brought to the attention of the Commission that small issuers were resorting to socalled "private financing" which in many instances was probably
in circumvention of the law, but in addition that large issuers were
also resorting to this device to the detriment of the public based
on their failure to disclose pertinent information relating to the
company.
In view of the dearth of either administrative or judicial interpretation at that time of what constituted a "transaction by an
issuer not involving any public offering," the Commission through
its General Counsel issued an administrative opinion - setting
forth the various factors which must be considered in determining
the availability of this statutory exemption. It also made clear
that the determination of what constitutes a "public offering" is
essentially a question of fact, in which all surrounding circumstances are to be taken into account. In the opinion, the Commission set forth the following four principal factors for guidance:
(1) The number of offerees and their relationship to each other
and to the issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size
of the offering; and (4) the manner of offering.
(1) The Number of Offerees and their Relationship to Each Other
and to the Issuer.
At the outset it should be remembered that there is no precise
number of offerees which may be used as an overall guide in determining when a "public offering" exists. It is also important to
note that the word "offerees" is not confined to the number of
actual buyers, but rather the number of persons to whom the
security in question is offered. Succintly stated, any attempt to
dispose of a security would be regarded as an offer within the
purview of the first principal factor. Preliminary conversations
or negotiations may be considered attempts at disposition if a
substantial number of prospective purchasers are dealt with. In
such case, the offering might be considered a "public offering" with
the statutory prerequisite of registration coming into play.6
The question then arises as to what constitutes a substantial
number of offerees. Actually, there is no mathematical formula
precise enough to answer this particular question. But the basis
on which the offerees are selected is a factor of major significance
in determining whether a "public offering" exists or not. Consequently, an offering to a given number of persons recruited at random from the general populace on the basis that they are possible
purchasers may be considered a "public offering," even though an
offering to a much larger group of persons who are all the members
a
cula las
iLe.. employees of a large concern, might be
considered a "private offering." On the other hand, there are instances where an offering confined to a particular group and ofSec. Act. Rel. 285 (1935).

'15 U.S.C. Sec. 77d (1951).
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fered to a sufficiently large number of persons may nevertheless
be considered a "public offering."
The relationship between the issuer and the prospective purchasers is also a matter to be given due weight. Concretely, an
offering to persons of a group who should have special knowledge
of the issuer is less likely to be a "public offering" than is an offering to the members of a class of the same size who do not possess
this advantage. In a case where a group of important executive
officers would have a close relationship to the issuer which ordinary
employees would not enjoy, the factor of relationship would be
particularly important in offerings to employees.
(2) The Number of Units Offered
In regard to the denominations of the units, the offering of
an unsubstantial number of units might presumably be an indication that no "public offering" would be involved. On the other hand,
the offering of many units in small denominations might indicate
that the issuer recognizes the probability of a distribution of the
security to the public at large. At this time, it would be well to
again stress the fact that the purpose of the exemption of nonpublic offerings would appear to have been to make registration
unnecessary in those relatively few cases where an issuer desires to
consummate a transaction or a few transactions and where the
transaction or transactions are of such a nature that the securities
in question are not likely to come into the hands of the public at
large.
(3)

The Size of the Offering
A perusal'of the language of the statute 7 reveals that the exemption pertains to "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering." Apropos the wording of this part of the statute,
it would be well to consider not merely the immediate particular
transactions between the issuer and the initial offerees, but also
the likelihood of a later public offering of all or part of the securities sold. It would therefore appear to follow that the statutory
exemption was intended to apply mainly to small offerings, which
in their very nature are less likely to be offered to the general
public than would be large offerings.
(4) The Manner of Offering
In view of the fact that the purpose of the exemption of nonpublic offering is limited in the main to instances wherein the
issuer has in mind to consummate a few transactions with specific
offerees, it would appear that those transactions which are negotiated by direct contact between the issuer and the initial purchaser
are less likely to be considered "public offerings" than those brought
about through the utilization of those means normally used for
purposes of public sale and distribution.
It should further be kept in mind that any dealer who might
15 U.S.C. Sec. 77d (1951).
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subsequently purchase securities from an initial purchaser would
be required to satisfy himself that the initial purchaser had not
purchased with a view to distribution. If the initial purchaser had
bought with the intent to distribute, he would be considered an
underwriter, and sales by a dealer of securities bought by him
from such an initial purchaser, would, as a general rule, not be
exempt until at least a year after the purchase of the securities
by the dealer. The sale of unregistered securities to a limited number of initial purchasers, therefore leads to a practical situation
in which such initial purchasers may have difficulty in disposing
of the securities purchased by them. Of course, ultimately each
case is to be decided on its own facts and no magical formula may
be availed of to fit each and every conceivable situation in order
to determine whether the situation is one involving a "public offering" or a "private offering."
(c) Judicial Interpretation
Although the interpretation by the Commission as to what
constitutes a "public offering" is entitled to great weight," it was
for the courts to have the final word as to whether a transaction
was to be considered either a "private" or a "public" offering. As
we move into the judicial sphere of operations we note that the
first case of importance to come before the courts to decide whether
a transaction was a "private offering" and therefore exempt from
registration under the Act was the case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. The Sunbeam Gold Mines Co. et al.9 In that case the
defendant Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., a Nevada corporation, with
stockholders in various states of the union, entered into an agreement with another company, the Golden West Consolidated Mines,
to purchase all the assets of the latter, subject to the approval of
the stockholders of both companies. While the agreement was
pending this approval, the defendant company issued through the
mails a number of letters-530, to be exact. Of the 530 recipients,
115 were stockholders of the defendant Sunbeam Company; 207
were stockholders of the Golden West Mines; and 208 were stockholders of both companies. These 530 persons were scattered
through various states. The letters solicited pledge loan agreements from the stockholders for the purposes of completing the
purchase by the Sunbeam Company of the assets of the Golden
West Mines and of raising enough money to register a contemplated new issue of stock with the Securities and Exchange Commission. On the basis of these facts, the Commission brought this
suit under Section 20(a) of the Act 1o authorizing injunctions
against issuance of securities in violation of the Act.
Although the court below, in denying an interlocutory injunction, held that the shareholder's loan receipt was a security within
Campbell v. Degethner, 97 F. Supp. 975, 977

'95

F. 2d 699 (C.C.A. Wash.) 1938.
115 U.S.C. Sec. 77t(a).

(1951).
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the meaning of the Act and that its distribution through the mails
over state lines did make it subject to the required registration
proceedings, it nevertheless held that such a distribution to stockholders did not involve a "public offering." The language of its conclusion of law is:
The transactions by the defendants herein, being
solely with stockholders of Sunbeam Gold Mines Co. and
Golden West Consolidated Mines, all of said stockholders
being stockholders of respondent company through merger of said corporations, do not, irrespective of the number of said stockholders, involve a public offering within
the meaning of Sec. 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended; and the plaintiff's application for preliminary
injunction is therefore denied.
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, the Appellate Court reversed the lower court and held that
the offering of securities was a "public offering" and hence not
within the exception to the requirements of the Securities Act of
1933. In coming to this conclusion that the offering involved herein
was a public one, the court proceeded to trace the legislative history of the section. In one of the House Reports 11 the court restated the language of the House, to-wit:
Sales of stock to stockholders become subject to the
Act unless the stockholders are so small in number that the
sale to them does not constitute a public offering.
In further tracing the legislative history of the section pertaining to "public offerings," the court went on to say:
Again, in 1934, when the Securities Act was amended,
15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 77b et seq. and notes, a proposal to exempt from registration securities offered by an issuer to
its employees was rejected by the Committee of Conference of the two Houses. In this connection, the Managers
on the part of the House stated: "The conferees eliminated the third proposed amendment to this subsection on
the ground that the participants in employees' stock-investment plans may be in as great need of the protection
afforded by availability of information concerning the
issuer for which they work as are most other members of
the public." H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p.
41.
These Reports clearly demonstrate that the Congress
did not intend the term "public offering" to mean an offering to any and all members of the public who cared to
avail themselves of the offer, and that an offering to stockholders, other than a very small number, was a public
offering.
H. R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. (1933) 25.
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Cases are cited by the appellees in which are given
interpretations of the word "public" in regulatory statutes. None is shown to have the legislative history of the
Securities Act and none applies the rule of strict construction of the instant exception to the general policy of the
legislation required by the Supreme Court.
We therefore hold that an offering of securities under
the Securities Act of 1933 may be a public offering though
confined to stockholders of an offering company, a fortiori
where the offerees include the stockholders of another
company,
though seeking to become stockholders of the
12
offeror.
In this case, the court also pointed out that an issuer of corporate stock who pleads the exemption from registration requirments afforded to transactions not involving any "public offering,"
has the burden of proving that a "public offering" was not involved.
The issuer in this case had clearly failed to establish his burden
of proof.
In 1943, another case of importance pertaining to the question
of a "public offering" came before the same Appellate Court.' 3 In
this case, the appellant, who was President of the Merger Mines
Corporation, lent to the said corporation 772,541 shares of stock
of the said corporation, which were to be used to satisfy the company's stock liability to certain other companies and also its liability to other creditors. It was understood that the articles of
incorporation would be amended so as to increase the stock authorization by a million shares, and that the stock would be returned
to appellant out of the "new issue of stock."
Acting as amicus curiae, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a brief addressed solely to the proposition that the
court below erred when it decreed that the stock to be offered to
appellant and to the 1100 other stockholders of the company need
not be registered with any governmental regulatory body. It was
argued that, although Section 3(a) (10) of the Securities Act of
1933, as amended, 14 exempts any security that was issued in exchange for outstanding securities or other interests where the
terms of issuance and exchange are approved by a court or other
proper governmental authority after a prescribed hearing; that in
the present case the court found that no such hearing had been
held. The court went on to say:
The hearing must be one "at which all persons to
whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange
shall have the right to appear." No one contends that the
requirements for such a hearing have been met in the
case at bar; for the section provides that the hearing
95 F. 2d 699, 702 (C.C.A. Wash.) 1938.
"137 F. 2d 335 (C.C.A. Wash.) 1943.
15 U.S.C. Sec. 77c(a) (10) (1933).
'2
1
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shall be specifically upon the "fairness" of the "terms and
conditions" that are "approved" by the court or other
authority.
The Commission then argued that the proposed stock issue did
15
not come within the exemptions of Sec. 4(1) of the Act, which
reads as follows:
Section 4. The provisions of section 5 (making unlawful the failure to register) shall not apply to any of
the following transactions:
(1) Transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer; transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering; or transactions by a
dealer (including an underwriter no longer acting as an
underwriter in such transaction), except transactions
within one year after the first date upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or
by or through an underwriter (excluding in the computation of such year any time during which a stop order
issued under section 8 is in effect as to the security), and
except transactions as to securities constituting the whole
or a part of an unsold allotment to or subscription by such
dealer as a participant in the distribution of such securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter.
The Commission also urged that the foregoing provision did
not exempt the proposed offering of the company's stock to the
1100 stockholders and cited the Sunbeam Gold Mines case in support of its contention.
The Commission further argued that Sec. 4(1) did not exempt any public offering by appellant of the stock acquired by him
for resale, for in that event appellant would come within the definition of "underwriter" in Sec. 2(11) of the statute,1" the pertinent
part of that section reading as -follows:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security
The court then went on to say:
As the amicus curiae brief points out, the appellant
Pearson will probably reoffer to the public at least a
part of the shares that they acquire from the company.
Accordingly, registration would have to be effected by the
appellant corporation before the shares could be reoffered
by Pearson.
Furthermore, there is no need for the decree in this
case to contain any reference to registration in connec' 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77d(1) (1933).
1015 U.S.C. Sec. 77b(11) (1933).

368

DICTA

Sept.-Oct., 1955

tion with Pearson's allotment of the stock. If they take
the shares with the view to investment, the exemption
will apply by operation of law. If, on the other hand,
they acquire the shares with a view to reselling them to
the public, section 4(1) will have to be enforced regardless of any attempted exemption set out in the decree.
The court concluded its decision with the following
language:
The decree of the court below should be modified so
as to eleminate any reference to exemption from registration "with any governmental regulatory body . . .,17
That same year, 1943, another case of significance was brought
for decision before the Federal Court. That case was Corporation
Trust Co. v. Logan."s In that case, the facts disclosed that certain
persons as owners of 373,791 shares of Class B stock of MissouriKansas Pipe Line Company, a Delaware corporation (herein called
"Mokan"), entered into a Voting Trust Agreement dated April 12,
1943. On July 22, 1943, the shares of stock were delivered for
deposit with the Industrial Trust Company of Wilmington, the
agent named in the agreement. Instruction letters and signed stock
powers were deposited along with the shares. After copies of the
trust agreement were filed at the offices of Mokan and Industrial
Trust Company, the latter as agent issued temporary Voting Trust
Certificates for delivery to the depositing stockholders in exchange
for their shares in Mokan. There was no understanding between
the stockholders for a registration statement or any attempt to
comply with the Securities Act of 1933. The defendants thereafter
tendered their temporary Voting Trust Certificates and asked the
Court to decree that their original issuance was illegal.
The essence of their cross claim, as amended, was that there
was a total failure to comply with the Federal Securities Act of
1933 19 in connection with the creation of the Voting Trust Agreement. And since the issuance of Voting Trust Certificates under
that agreement was in violation of law, the exchange of securities
thereunder should be rescinded and set aside.
The Court held that the Voting Trust Agreement for the issuance of Voting Trust Certificates in exchange for the stock of
the corporation which had an authorized capitalization of 5,000,000
shares, of which about 800,000 shares were outstanding among
3,500 holders, contemplated the issuance of "securities" in connection with a "public offering" within the Act. In rendering its decision, the Court used the following language:
It is clear that the case at bar comes within, the first
classification of Sec. 12 which relates to unlawful sales
' Merger Mines Corporation et al. v. Grismer, 137 F. 2d 335, 341, 342 (C.C.A.
Wash.) 1943.
152 F. Supp. 999 (1943).
" 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77a et seq. (1933).
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of securities for which no registration statement has been
filed. Under that section, the remedy afforded is the right
to sue, either in law or in equity, "to recover the consideration paid for such security . . ." As the Voting Trust
Certificate is, under the statute, the security, the consideration paid in exchange therefor can only be the Mokan
stock, and it is this stock which defendants seek to have
restored to them upon the tender of their trust certificates.
I conclude the statute authorizes the relief prayed for
here.
The next case of importance to come before the Federal Court
was the case of Campbell v. Degenther.2 0 This too was an action
under the Securities Act of 1933 21 to recover the consideration
paid for undivided interests in oil well drilling operations. The
facts disclose that the defendant was engaged in the drilling for
oil and gas in the State of Michigan. To finance the projects, uiidivided interests in the leases which he held were sold to various
persons, among whom were the plaintiffs.
The business venture was not advertised nor was any other
means employed to disseminate the information to the general
public. The parties became acquainted through mutual business
associates and the investments of the plaintiffs with the defendant
produced commercially productive wells in some instances.
The problem that came about in this case arose out of the
investments made by the plaintiffs with the defendant in the drilling of Howard Well No. 1. There were 32 shares sold in said well
at a cost of $127.40 per share. Each of the plaintiffs purchased one
share or a one thirty-second interest. The well was drilled in as
a dry hole.
Plaintiffs contend that prior to the sale of said interests there
was no registration statement in effect nor any
prospectus issued
22
.as required by Section 5 of the Securities Act.
By the terms of the Securities Act, plaintiffs ask to recover
the consideration paid for said security, with interest thereon from
April 9, 1948, less the amount of income received thereon, upon
tender of such security.
The Court held that each of the plaintiffs was not entitled to
recover the amount paid for the undivided one thirty-second interest in Howard Well No. 1. In summing up its decision, The
Court stated the following:
The defendant has satisfied the required burden of
proof to establish himself as exempt from the provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933. By reason of the small
number of participants in the venture and their familiar" 97 F. Supp. 975 (1951).

"15 U.S.C. Sec. 77a et seq.

2115 U.S.C. Sec. 77(e) (1951).
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ity with each other, I cannot translate the security transactions into a public offering.
At most, the transactions herein conducted were a
close-knit arrangement among friends and acquaintances
on a purely personal basis, without any systematic scheme
or promotion program for sale of said securities to the
general public or any select group sufficient in size to fall
within the province of a public offering.
Another case of importance came before the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada during the early part of
1953. That was the case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Searchlight Consolidated Mining & Milling Co. 2 3 The facts in that
case disclosed that the defendants had been selling securities,
namely, shares of the common capital stock, 10¢ par value, of
defendant, Searchlight Consolidated Mining & Milling Co.; and in
the sales of such securities had been directly and indirectly using.
the mails and means and instruments of transportation and communication in interstate commerce. And at no time had a registration statement with respect to such securities been in effect
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
One of the specifications in the motion to dismiss raised by
the defendants was that solicitation by the defendants was confined to existing stockholders, and that such stockholders were not
to be considered as members of the public.
The Court made short shrift of this contention by the defendants and held that the offering of securities was a "public offering" and therefore not within exemptions to the provisions of the
Act requiring disclosure of information even though solicitation
was confined to existing stockholders. Again, the Sunbeam Gold
Mines case was cited by the Court in support of its holding.
Despite the adjudications of the Federal Courts on the question of "private" or "public" offering, no tangible criteria evolved
as a guide of reliability from these decisions. No specific formulae
were set forth by any of the judicial tribunals before whom such
cases were brought for adjudication.
Finally, on June 8, 1953, the leading case on the subject of
"public offering" was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States. That case was Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Ralston Purina Co.2 4 The facts in that case disclosed that Ralston
Purina sold nearly $2,000,000.00 of stock to employees of the company residing in many different states without registering with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. In so doing, it had made
use of he ma-ls. The Ralston Company contended that the shares
were sold only to key personnel in keeping with its policy of encouraging its employees to become stockholders of the corporation.
F. Supp. 726 (1953).
'346 U.S. 981 (1953).
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Both the District Court 2 and the Circuit Court 2"held that
the offering
was a "private offering" and within the exemption of
27
the Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that
the issue was not a "private offering" within the exemption of the
Act. In its decision, the Supreme Court said that some employee
offerings may be exempt. For example, an offering limited to
executive personnel who because of their position have access to
the same kind of information that the Act would make available
in the form of a registration statement, would come within the
exemption. The number of persons to whom the offer is made does
not determine whether the offering is "public" or "private." The
Supreme Court laid down four criteria to determine whether the
offering is "private" or "public". If the offering comes within
these criteria, it is a "private offering" and not a "public offering."
The criteria are:
(1) That the offering is limited to a special class and
not to the public generally;
(2) That the purchasers of the shares intend to take
the shares for investment and not for resale;
(3) That the purchasers have access to the kind of
information which a registration statement would disclose;
(4) Whether there is a need of the offerees as a class
for protection afforded by registration.
In its decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the Ralston Purina Co. failed to prove that its offering to
employees came within the criteria establishing a private offering.
The offering was not limited to key personnel but was made available to any one of its 7,000 employees. The exemption, the Court
said, does not deprive corporate employees from the safeguards of
the Act. A thorny problem had at last received a final adjudication.
III. CONCLUSION
In answer to the original query, it may now be stated that
whether or not a proposed offering or sale of securities of a corporation in interstate commerce is "private" or "public" ultimately
depends upon whether the issuer can sustain the burden of proving facts sufficient to make the offering a "private offering" within
the tests of the Ralston Purinacase as laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States. It is hoped that the decision in this
case and the criteria enumerated by the highest court of the land
will prove a beacon of light for future guidance to both Bench and
Bar in resolving the time honored question of "private" or "public"
offering.
2 102 F. Supp. 964 (1952).

2200 F. 2d 85 (8th Cir. 1952).
"15 U.S.C. Sec. 77d(1) (1951).

